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THE WRITFEN CONTRACT AS SAFE HARBOR FOR
DISHONEST CONDUCT
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN*
INTRODUCTION
The law of contracts gives special status to the written word. The
statute of frauds requires some contracts to be in writing.' The parol
evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence of prior or contempo-
raneous understandings of an agreement when a document purports
to encompass their entire understanding. In theory, these practices
are designed to add certainty to business transactions and to inhibit
the introduction of unreliable evidence into the litigation system. But
in practice, life is not that simple. This Article explores an
unintended consequence of the reliance on written contracts: If we
eliminate the introduction of precontractual representations and
understandings from the dispute resolution process, we create a safe
harbor for unethical business practices in the early stages of contract
formation. If, in contrast, we weaken the parol evidence rule to
permit extrinsic evidence under additional circumstances, we create
predictable opportunities for the types of questionable testimony that
the parol evidence rule was designed to avoid. This tension is at least
in part intractable.
A substantial literature addresses such issues as whether the
parol evidence rule should be preserved at all, and if so, how it should
be applied in various situations. For example, a recent article by Eric
Posner develops economically-motivated criteria for deciding when
courts should employ a "hard" parol evidence rule, which is
unyieldingly loyal to the language of the contract, and when courts
should employ a "soft" version of the rule, which allows more resort
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Judge Stan Bernstein, Neil
Cohen, Ted Janger, Roy Kreitner, Norman Poser, Jennifer Rosato, Peter Tiersma and Jonathan
Yovel for helpful discussion, and to Jackie Bieber, Amy Blackman, Mary Ann Buckley and
Stacey Winograd for their valuable research. This work was supported by a summer research
grant from Brooklyn Law School.
1. See, e.g., CAL Civ. CODE § 1624 (West 2001); 740 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 80/0.01-18
(West 1993).
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to context.2 I refer to some of that literature in this Article and
basically accept its contribution. The problems discussed here,
however, are likely to occur regardless of what version of the rule is
applied in any particular circumstance. Therefore, this Article
recommends solutions from outside the law of contract to address
both precontractual misconduct and false testimony in the courtroom.
To see the problem, let us examine three scenarios. Consider
first the standard procedure for registering at a hotel. The clerk looks
up your reservation, takes your credit card, and then asks you to sign
the bottom of the registration form and to initial the places on the
form that state the nightly rate and the checkout date. This
procedure can only help to reduce the number of disputes over the
terms of a hotel stay. No one can claim that the clerk misspoke in
stating a lower rate than the one on the form because that would no
longer be credible in light of the guest having initialed the rate. The
procedure will probably benefit the hotel more often than the guest,
since in the aggregate more tired guests are likely to make mistakes in
hearing or reading the rate than are clerks in presenting it.
More significantly, to the extent that there is a base level of
dishonesty in our culture, one would expect less of it from hotel clerks
who have nothing to gain than from travelers who can reduce the cost
of their stay by "negotiating" a new rate at checkout by accusing the
hotel of misstating the rate upon registration. Over time, the reliance
on clear written statements of the terms of the agreement should
reduce the cost of operating hotels by increasing the rate of
collection, which, at least in principle, can result in more efficient and
competitive markets.
Second, we can change the dynamic by giving the person in the
hotel clerk's position an incentive to be dishonest. Examples are easy
enough to find. The used car salesman is the classic one, although
lemon laws have made this cultural icon example less prominent. In
today's world, more salient is the credit card company that sends out
misleading advertisements, which contain provisions to the effect that
once a credit card is issued, the user is bound by the terms of an
agreement that he has never seen, and which may be different from
what he could have reasonably surmised from reading the advertise-
ment. While most readers of this Article may throw these advertise-
ments away, someone, no doubt, is taking the bait, or the solicitations
2. See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 534 (1998).
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would have stopped a long time ago. A similar set of incentives
obtains with retail sales practices in the technology industry.3
In theory, reliance on written agreements reduces dishonesty by
reducing the opportunities to commit perjury about one's under-
standing about precontractual events. No doubt some unscrupulous
credit card users would like to get out of arrangements into which
they knowingly entered. In practice, such reliance on written
contracts also creates a safe harbor for untoward practices that some
businesses are all too happy to practice. One side is motivated to
behave badly during the period of contract formation, while the other
party is motivated to behave badly during the resolution of a dispute.
Third, situations concerning agreements among business entities
are often quite different. In these instances, there is likely to be real
negotiation and actual familiarity with the contract's terms.
Nonetheless, issues such as the applicability of contractual provisions
to unforeseen events, whether the contract was actually intended to
be the entire agreement between the parties, whether the contract has
been modified by conduct even if it originally was intended as the
entire agreement, and many others, are bound to occur. This is the
classic case in which both sides have an incentive to misbehave during
a dispute resolution even if they both acted honorably when the
contract was originally being formed. Here, a hard and fast parol
evidence rule would almost certainly lead a court to making unjust
decisions in a significant number of cases. The legal system often
relaxes the rule under these circumstances.
This flexibility is characteristic of, but is certainly not limited to,
agreements between firms. With construction contracts, for example,
both sides may be happy to have terms such as the price, materials,
and scope of the work in writing. The owner is protected against a
contractor using less costly materials, or saying that certain work was
not included in the price, and the contractor is protected against the
owner's "renegotiating" the contract after the work has been done.
Nevertheless, disagreements over construction contracts occur
frequently, and the contract, at the very least, reduces the potential
breadth of a subsequent dispute.
This Article will argue, based on insights from linguistics and
psychology, that many of the intuitions underlying standard contract
theory are well founded. Privileging the written contract serves a
useful function precisely because people do forget what was said, and
3. Both computer sales and credit card sales are discussed infra Part III.
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because people really do testify dishonestly, or at least consistently
with a self-serving reality that they have created in their own minds
about events underlying a litigation. Yet, the Article will also explore
the unintended consequence of the rule, and suggest both stronger
sanctions against dishonest testimony in business disputes, and
stronger consumer protection to avoid precontractual heavy-
handedness and outright fraud. Firms are the parol evidence rule's
principal beneficiaries, since more often than not, they are the ones
who draft the contracts, protecting themselves against recurring
problems that can lead to litigation. When they must testify, they
should be held to a high level of candor.
Part I of this Article is a brief discussion of the parol evidence
rule and its motivations. Part II looks more closely at the motivating
values-the reduction of perjury, the reduction of reliance on faulty
memories, and distrust for juries-in light of recent advances in
psychology and linguistics. Part II concludes that there is good reason
for maintaining the parol evidence rule, although the distinction
between forgetting and lying is not as sharp as the legal system would
have it. On the other hand, uncertainties about the meaning of
language, also part of the legal system's intuitions about the parol
evidence rule, call for a weaker version of the rule in some circum-
stances. The result is an intractable tension between fostering bad
decision making on the one hand (by forcing fact finders to rely on
less context than is needed to fully understand the relationship
between the parties), and creating an opportunity for inaccurate
testimony on the other.
Part III discusses the safe harbor for sharp business practices that
results from any version of the rule that permits businesses to
promote products and services subject to a subsequent, integrated
agreement that the other party did not read or understand when
entering into a transaction. The point is illustrated with a discussion
of credit card solicitations, shrink-wrap contracts, and disputed
promissory notes.
Part IV is a conclusion. I do not recommend doing much to
change the parol evidence rule, which really does function to increase
reliance on actual agreements and to discourage bogus disputes.
However, I do recommend much more aggressive regulation of the
two safe harbors that it creates: sharp or dishonest precontractual
representations, and false testimony to the extent that testimony is
allowed.
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I. THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AND THE WRITTEN TEXT
One way to avoid dishonest behavior in the resolution of busi-
ness disputes is to encourage the parties to put their agreement in
writing, and to limit the dispute resolution process to what the written
agreement says. This, of course, is just what the parol evidence rule
does. A typical statement of the rule is: "[I]f the parties assent to a
writing as the final and complete expression of the terms of their
agreement, evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements may
not be admitted to contradict, vary, or add to the terms of the
writing. ' '4
The purpose of the rule is to improve the resolution of business
disputes by reducing the judicial system's reliance on potentially
faulty memories; by reducing the likelihood of perjured testimony; by
reducing the amount of testimony altogether; by putting more
decision making in the hands of judges, who are more likely than
jurors to bring uniformity to the decision making process, and thus
predictability to business transactions; and by creating incentives for
those engaging in transactions to put their agreements in integrated
writings, thus reducing both the costs and the uncertainty of dispute
resolution. 5 The New York Court of Appeals presents a fairly typical
rationale:
A familiar and eminently sensible proposition of law is that,
when parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete docu-
ment, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to its
terms. Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to
what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally in-
admissible to add to or vary the writing. That rule imparts "stability
to commercial transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent
claims, perjury, death of witnesses[,] infirmity of memory and the
fear that the jury will improperly evaluate the extrinsic evidence.6
Each of these goals makes good sense, which is probably why the
parol evidence rule has remained a principle of law since at least
1604,1 and probably earlier. As one article has put it, "[t]he rule may
4. Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule and Implied Terms: The Sounds of
Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 36 (1985). See U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2A-202 for some current
revisions of the rule.
5. See Justin Sweet, Contract Making and Parol Evidence: Diagnosis and Treatment of a
Sick Rule, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1049-51 (1968); Michael B. Metzger, The Parol Evidence
Rule: Promissory Estoppel's Next Conquest?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1386-87 (1983).
6. W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990).
7. The parol evidence rule is often traced back to The Countess of Rutland's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 89 (K.B. 1604).
[E]very contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as
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have survived the disappearance from our law of other vestiges of
formalism because a written contract furnishes more reliable evidence
of the terms of an agreement than does the parties' oral testimony,
which may be the product of faulty memory, wishful thinking, or
outright prevarication. '8 The rule has the added advantage of putting
certainty into commercial dispute resolution by reducing the role of
the jury.9
The conceptual move that launched the rule seems quite natural
today: The written agreement is not merely a memorandum that
summarizes understandings between people. Rather, the document
constitutes the agreement itself.10 Peter Tiersma points out that this
reconceptualization was part of a larger movement from oral to
written law, which included not only the Statute of Frauds," enacted
in 1677, but also an earlier shift in the interpretation of statutes, which
occurred as the result of the invention of the printing press and the
growth of literacy. 2 The consequences of this shift in focus from
verbal legal events to written ones cannot be overstated. Reliance on
the written word is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it reduces
the likelihood of dispute about what the agreement (or statute) really
says. On the other, it empowers the party with the pen. When only
one party to the transaction controls the document, the possibility
arises that the drafter will take advantage of this leverage unfairly.
Thus, in addition to intended consequences, there are likely to be
some unintended ones. This is where theory and practice diverge.
the first deed.... Also it would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by
advice and on consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the
agreement of the parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved
by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory. And it would be dangerous to
purchasers and farmers, and all others in such cases, if such nude averments against
matter in writing should be admitted.
77 Eng. Rep. at 90. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent,
98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 899 n.73 (1985) ("Chief Justice Popham's observations in The Countess
of Rutland's Case became proverbial, and others generalized them to include written
documents of a noncontractual nature." (citations omitted)).
8. Metzger, supra note 5, at 1386.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF
CONTRACr 88-89 (1990).
11. For discussion of the application of the statute of frauds in contemporary business
disputes, see Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable
Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1859 (1996).
12. For discussion of the broader history, see PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 36-
40 (1999). For discussion of statutes as autonomous texts, see Peter M. Tiersma, A Message in a
Bottle: Text, Autonomy and Statutory Interpretation, 72 TUL L. REV. (forthcoming December
2001).
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As for the parol evidence rule itself, one scholar after another
begins discussion with a statement of frustration about the incoher-
ence of its application.,3 Wigmore's statement is typical: "[T]he so-
called parol evidence rule is attended with confusion and obscurity
which make it the most discouraging subject in the whole field of
evidence."'14 In this Article, I will neither attack the rule, as has been
a tradition,"s nor attempt to fine-tune it in order to bring theory and
practice in closer harmony. 16 Instead, my goal is to examine some
practices in both the business world and the courtroom that result
from a legal system that places so much weight on the written text. I
will do so in light of some of what we have discovered in recent years
about language and psychology, and in light of the rule's stated
justifications.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE: A
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC CRITIQUE
This Part of the Article will examine the goals of the rule in light
of some advances in the study of language and the study of social
psychology, to see how well-suited the rule is for its intended
purposes.
Some of the findings are not remarkable. For example, tradi-
tional scholars' intuitions about the frailty of human memory were
basically correct. People are terrible at recalling exactly what was
said, but are somewhat better at recalling the gist of what was said. 7
However, they recall gist as filtered through mental models that may
distort the truth about what actually happened. As for perjury, much
of the concern has been about protecting the firm against consumers
and others who are willing to prevaricate. I accept this concern as
legitimate. In addition, however, recent work in social psychology
has focused on how incentive systems within the modern firm often
13. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The "Parol Evidence" Rule, 6 HARV. L. REV. 325 (1893)
("Few things in our law are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties."); Sweet, supra note
5, at 1036, 1037; 3 ARTHUR LINION CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 582, at 455 (2d ed.
1960) ("It would have been far better had no such rule ever been stated.").
14. 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2400, at 4
(1981).
15. For example, the Law Commission has recommended that the rule be abandoned
entirely in the United Kingdom. For discussion, see J. BEATSON, ANSON'S LAW OF CONTRACT
131 (27th ed. 1998).
16. See Posner, supra note 2.
17. See Jacqueline Strunk Sachs, Recognition Memory for Syntactic and Semantic Aspects
of Connected Discourse, in 2 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 437 (1967).
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strengthen temptations to act dishonestly when the stakes are raised.18
The data come from stories of corporate wrongdoing outside the
courtroom, but we will see that the worst features of these incentive
systems are typically at play when businesses enter the world of
litigation.
On the other hand, there is a problem with an absolute bar on
parol evidence that the law already recognizes. The human language
faculty is in some ways fragile, so that contractual language that
seemed clear when it was written can sometimes later be susceptible
to inappropriate and unforeseen interpretations. 9 Thus, it might be
necessary to examine context in order to interpret sensibly language
that seemed clear at first glance. This is the position that Corbin took
more forcefully in response to Williston.0 It is the position taken by
many courts, including courts in Illinois.21 It is the position of Judge
Posner, 2 and it is the position worked out recently by Eric Posner,23
who has argued for relaxing the parol evidence rule most when the
risk of error is greatest.
These two sets of observations about cognitive capacity involve
tradeoffs. To the extent that the parol evidence rule adds certainty to
legal interpretation, reducing its strength compromises certainty. To
the extent that the rule eliminates incentives for perjury and negates
the effect of poor memory on the litigation system, reducing its
strength compromises these advantages as well. But the situation is
even worse, as Claire Hill has pointed out.24 Hill discusses contractual
18. See, e.g., CODES OF CONDUCE. BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS
(David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL
BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS (John M. Darley et al. eds., 2001).
19. Sometimes, courts discuss this issue by drawing a distinction between "patent" and
"latent" ambiguity. As the Fifth Circuit has recently stated: "A patent ambiguity is evident on
the face of the contract. A latent ambiguity arises when a contract which is unambiguous on its
face is applied to the subject matter with which it deals and an ambiguity appears by reason of
some collateral matter." Constitution State Ins. Co. v. Iso-Tex Inc., 61 F.3d 405, 408 (5th Cir.
1995).
20. Compare 4 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 631, at
948-51 (3d ed. 1961), with 3 CORBIN, supra note 13, § 573, at 357. For discussion of this history,
see Hadjiyannakis, supra note 4, at 45-55.
21. See, e.g., Ahsan v. Eagle, Inc., 678 N.E.2d 1238, 1241 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997); Meyer v.
Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
22. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 620 (7th Cir. 1989).
Judge Posner uses the terms "intrinsic ambiguity" and "extrinsic ambiguity" to capture the
notion of context-dependence. Id.
23. Posner, supra note 2.
24. Claire A. Hill, A Comment on Language and Norms in Complex Business Contracting,
77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 29 (2001).
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language in the framework of relational contract theory. 25 In some
contracts, especially complex contracts between large firms, the
people performing the contract are not fully familiar with the
contractual language. 26 The contract is a combination of boilerplate
and negotiated terms that lawyers drafted with particular contin-
gencies in mind that may be remote from anything that is at stake in a
particular dispute. Here, where there is most likely to be a need for
parol evidence because of the complexity of the situation, parol
evidence has the least to offer, especially regarding the proffered
testimony of those whose job it is to perform the contract. All of this
leaves us with some good doctrine, with some intractable problems,
and with some problems whose solution must lie outside the realm of
evidentiary rules.
A. Forgetting and Lying
A frequent justification for the parol evidence rule, as stated
earlier, is the desire to improve the resolution of business disputes by
creating a process that is relatively free from unreliable types of
evidence, from the whims of jurors,27 and from dishonesty. I deal with
memory and lying here.
1. Forgetting and Reconstructing Reality28
Basically, we remember two seconds of verbatim speech.29 What
happens with the information after the actual words cannot be
recalled is still a matter of active research and debate among
psychologists of language. But the fact that the actual words remain
with us only briefly is uncontroversial.
25. Id. For recent discussion of relational contract theory, see Symposium, Relational
Contract Theory: Unanswered Questions: A Symposium in Honor of Ian R. MacNeil, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 737 (2000); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
737; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992).
26. Hill, supra note 24, at 34-42.
27. Although juror reliability has been a theme for hundreds of years, the matter has not
been studied empirically, to the best of my knowledge. We have no idea, for example, how
often juries are likely to side with the weaker party when that party's position is not legally
meritorious. Recent research indicates that in the context of tort suits, such concerns are not in
keeping with the facts, which indicate juries decide cases consistent with expectations of the
business community most of the time. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL
JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000).
28. This discussion is from LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, LANGUAGE ON
TRIAL (unpublished book manuscript, on file with author).
29. For discussion, see ALAN BADDELEY, HUMAN MEMORY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1990).
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In one early study, Jacqueline Sachs30 read various passages to
subjects. One of the sentences in each passage was the target
sentence. After the passage was completed, the experimenter
presented subjects with another sentence-the test sentence. The test
sentences were either the same as the target sentence, different from
the target sentence only in form but not in substance, different in
substance, or different in whether the sentence was in the active or
passive voice. For example, for the target sentence, "He sent a letter
about it to Galileo, the great Italian scientist," the test sentences were:
1. He sent a letter about it to Galileo, the great Italian
scientist. (Same)
2. He sent Galileo, the great Italian scientist, a letter about
it. (Form)
3. Galileo, the great Italian scientist, sent him a letter about
it. (Substance)
4. A letter about it was sent to Galileo, the great Italian
scientist. (Passive) 31
Subjects were asked to say whether the test sentence was one
that they had heard in the passage, and how certain they were about
it. When asked to answer immediately after hearing the target
sentence (i.e., when the target sentence was the last one in the
passage), subjects were correct between 85 and 95 percent of the time,
depending on the condition. When asked after hearing an additional
sixty syllables of the passage, they continued to perform well (about
80 percent correct) on only the test sentence whose meaning had
changed (sentence three in the example given above). When 180
syllables of passage intervened between the target sentence and the
test sentence, subjects still were correct more than 70 percent of the
time in recognizing that the semantically altered test sentence was
one that they had not heard, but performed only slightly better than
chance on the others.32 This shows that we do pretty well recalling the
gist of what we hear, but cannot reliably recognize the exact words
even a few moments later.
But while we are better at recalling the gist of what was said, we
are not really great at that either. For example, Amina Memon and
A. Daniel Yarmey examined how different interview techniques
affect recall. 33 Subjects listened to seven minutes of a monologue
30. Sachs, supra note 17.
31. Id. at 439.
32. Id. at 441.
33. Amina Memon & A. Daniel Yarmey, Earwitness Recall and Identification: Comparison
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recorded on tape. Two days later, they returned to answer questions
about what was said, and to try to identify the voice they had heard.
Subjects only remembered an average number of details ranging from
13.10 to 16.20, depending on the interview technique that solicited
their responses.M They also erroneously recalled an average of about
1.25 details that were never said. The authors concluded: "Witnesses
had a difficult time recalling details about the 7-minute monologue,
even though the retention interval was only two days. '35
To make matters worse, in recalling events listeners are very
suggestible. This was the point of an important study by Elizabeth F.
Loftus and John C. Palmer.36 People were shown a film of a car
accident and then asked questions about it. Depending on how the
questions were asked, subjects remembered what they had seen
differently when asked to retell the story a few weeks later.37
Imagine, then, what happens when a corporate executive is
interviewed by lawyers about the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a contract that is now in litigation. Assume that the
executive is basically an honest person, but has only sketchy memory
of the events. The lawyers brief their client on how the case seems to
be coming together and ask - quite in earnest - whether the executive
recalls facts relating to the negotiation that can be helpful. Much of
the time, I submit, that executive's memory will be appropriately
jogged, and he will testify at the deposition to the events the lawyers
want to hear as though they had just happened yesterday. This is not
because he is a liar. It is because he has reconstructed the story in
such a way as to integrate helpful scenarios into the parts of the story
that he actually remembers. I recall such experiences from my own
practice as a litigator, and I have interviewed corporate lawyers in
connection with this project whose recollections also accord with this
view.
Note how much more difficult the situation gets when we are
dealing with parties who, along the lines of Hill's discussion, never
knew much about the language of the contract.38 Once in a while,
of the Cognitive Interview and the Structured Interview, 88 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS
797 (1999).
34. Id. at 802.
35. Id.
36. Elizabeth F. Loftus & John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An
Example of the Interaction Between Language and Memory, 13 J. VERBAL LEARNING &
VERBAL BEHAV. 585 (1974).
37. Id.
38. See Hill, supra note 24.
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someone admits as much in a litigation.39 But if the witness does not,
then most of the testimony will be a matter of reconstructing reality.
This means that there will indeed be a great deal of inaccuracy in
testimony, even when people mean no harm.4° This is a function of
human nature and the litigation system generally, not a function of
the parol evidence rule. But to the extent that the rule disallows
testimony in some circumstances and allows it in others, it will
channel the situations in which these problems arise.
2. Lying
I do not have any idea how often litigants lie on the stand. But I
know they do. I have seen it. In my thirteen years as a litigator of
commercial disputes, I saw my clients lie, and I saw opposing parties
lie.41 The extent to which people behaved dishonestly in commercial
litigation was one of the most surprising and depressing observations
in my years of legal practice.
While written contracts serve to facilitate the smooth resolution
of disputes, additional considerations about honesty should be
confronted when it comes to business litigation. Social psychologists
have, over the past decade, identified incentive systems within the
corporate structure that appear to encourage sharp practices and
dishonesty. Recently, various anthologies of studies about corporate
ethics have been published.42 Serious acts of wrongdoing committed
by business executives are seen not as the isolated acts of bad people,
but rather as the predictable consequences of pressures and
incentives in today's corporate culture. Among the most interesting
of this work is that of John Darley.43
Darley argues that a number of factors in the routine of corpo-
rate life contribute to employees succumbing to the temptation to act
corruptly. Among them are: diffusion of information; diffusion and
fragmentation of responsibility; sunk costs; the opacity of ethical
39. "Miglin also testified that he was 'not concerned too much about the language' in the
purchase order, even though it did not expressly state that no payment would be due if a
suitable version of the photograph was not created. He thought that the parties understood one
another." Meyer v. Marilyn Miglin, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
40. See, e.g., Loftus & Palmer, supra note 36, at 585.
41. Like most lawyers, I generally believed that the opposing parties and their witnesses
were lying more.
42. See CODES OF CONDUCr: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHI-CS, supra
note 18; SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 18.
43. See John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES
OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 18, at 13.
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implications of decisions; and the fact that the individual facing
concrete decision options in the organization, once ethical issues are
visible, must function within a hierarchical structure on which that
individual depends for his livelihood.
For example, some companies socialize their employees to
"come to the perception of their customers as fools to whom no moral
obligations are owed." 44 When this happens in the securities industry,
for example, it can lead to a mentality in which customers are seen to
deserve their plight of being sold bad investments. Darley uses a
scandal at Salomon Brothers to illustrate this point.41 Other
incentives include fearing the consequences of backing away from a
set course of action, and fear of reprisal. Once a company has
committed substantial resources for a project, sometimes even betting
its future survival, the incentives to tailor one's narrative to conform
to the party line become enormous. This mindset offers a partial
explanation for the LTV scandal, in which the B.F. Goodrich
Corporation knowingly sold defective brake systems to an aircraft
manufacturer and committed itself to the viability of a technology
that was unable to perform the function for which it was designed.46
In addition, the individual employee's sense of self-interest and job
survival can lead him to do wrong not only by following an order, but
may even induce him to do wrong in advance of such an order. Such
an order may be an attempt to avoid putting his superior on the spot
in ordering the wrongdoing or, alternatively, out of a fear of being
perceived as lacking initiative. Throughout, the employee pays
attention to what happens to others in similar situations.47
Robert Cialdani suggests other factors on the employee's mind.
These include: reciprocation, commitment/consistency, social
validation, friendship, respect for authority, and scarcity.48 George
Lowenstein adds immediacy effects and a lack of self-awareness to
the list of factors that make corrupt business practice more likely.41
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 28-36.
47. See John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in Organizations and the
Unintended Action Consequences, in SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN
ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 18, at 37.
48. Robert B. Cialdani, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor Structure of Organizational
Dishonesty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra
note 18, at 44.
49. George Lowenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory and Business Ethics: Skewed Trade-
offs Between Self and Other, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS, supra note 18, at 214; see also John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Crime and
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How do these components of everyday social psychology make
their way into the litigation system? Consider this hypothetical
situation. A television network signs an agreement with a sports
league to televise the league's games for a three-year period. By the
end of the first year, it is clear that the agreement was a bad one. No
one is watching the games. The person at the network who made the
deal is in hot water. He and his superiors want to sue the league to
get the network out of the contract so that it will not have to
broadcast games in future years. It is difficult to imagine a situation
with more incentive for the executive to tell a story of negotiations
consistent with what the network wants him to say.
Much of the literature dealing with issues of dishonesty and the
parol evidence rule concerns external incentives.50 Lisa Bernstein's
distinction between what she calls "relationship-preserving norms"
("RPNs") and "end-game norms" ("EGNs") provides insight into
this dynamic." Bernstein observes:
There is empirical evidence from a variety of contracting con-
texts that suggests that merchants behave in ways that reflect an
implicit understanding of the distinction between end-game and
relationship-preserving norms and that they do not necessarily want
the RPNs they follow during the cooperative phase of their
relationship to be used to resolve disputes when their relationship is
at an end-game stage.52
Bernstein was writing about the Uniform Commercial Code's
reliance on custom and usage in resolving disputes. But there are
other relationship-preserving norms that become less significant when
a relationship is shot. Honesty is one. Parties who are extremely
angry at each other and no longer have a stake in acting honorably
for the sake of maintaining the other party's trust are more likely to
succumb to temptations to lie or cheat than are parties who remain
concerned about their relationship with the other party. Of course,
businesses still care about their reputations in the community, and
may well care about their relationships with opposing litigants when
the relationship involves many contracts for various goods and
services. Nonetheless, litigation is certainly an end-game circum-
stance, and honesty a relationship-preserving value.
Custom in Corporate Society: A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1997).
50. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2.
51. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996).
52. Id. at 1798.
[Vol. 77:87
2001] THE WRITTEN CONTRACT AS SAFE HARBOR FOR DISHONEST CONDUCT 101
Social science research shows that in end-game situations, people
are less cooperative and more competitive when they are acting as
part of a group than when they are acting on their own behalf. In a
series of studies, psychologists Chester Insko, John Schopler, and
their colleagues have used a prisoners' dilemma game to develop this
finding. "In the prisoners' dilemma, two reciprocally-situated parties
might be able to gain from mutual cooperation, but each is afraid to
cooperate because there is a high penalty attached to cooperating if
the other party does not."53 Subjects in Insko and Schopler's study
were asked to play a matrix game, in which the total scores tend to go
up in the long run if the two sides play cooperatively, and tend to go
down if they play competitively. 54 Participants playing on behalf of
groups routinely exhibited fewer cooperative responses, significantly
more competitive responses, and lower scores than did people playing
as individuals.5 The authors attribute this to an increase in fear and
greed in the context of intergroup dynamics. People believe that
groups are more competitive and less trustworthy than are individu-
als, and therefore are less willing to risk cooperating for fear that they
will be undermined. 6 At the same time, membership in a group
reinforces "support for competitive greed directed toward outgroups,
and that such learned beliefs are sufficient to produce the behavior
even in the absence of active social support. '5 7
In a subsequent study, 8 some of the subjects were told that the
game that they were about to play would be their only game, and
others were told that they would be interacting with their opponent at
the game six to eight times. In reality, all participants only played
once.59 Again, some subjects played as individuals, others as members
of a group. The results showed a significant reduction in the number
of competitive responses in the group condition for those subjects
53. Wendy J. Gordon, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 2579, 2585 n.31 (1994). The prisoners' dilemma is closely associated with the tragedy of
the commons. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108
YALE L.J. 601,620 (1998).
54. See ANDREW M. COLMAN, GAME THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS IN THE SOCIAL
AND BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 115-18 (2d ed. 1995). (My thanks to Chester Insko for bringing
this work to my attention.)
55. Chester A. Insko et al., Individual-Group Discontinuity as a Function of Fear and
Greed, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL 68 (1990).
56. Id. at 78.
57. Id.
58. Chester A. Insko et al., Interindividual-Intragroup Discontinuity Reduction Through the
Anticipation of Future Interaction, 80 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 95 (2001).
59. Id. at 100.
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who expected multiple encounters with their opponent. The authors
attribute this difference to an increase in trust that results from the
anticipation of working with the opponent in repeated situations.
They hypothesized that "with additional trials, participants might
recognize that mutual trust could produce mutual benefit and also
that anticipated conduct could, in itself, produce assumed mutual
trust."60
The authors of the study hypothesize that the fear component of
competitiveness comes primarily from outside the group.61 Yet in the
litigation context, internal relations within the firm no doubt play an
important role.62 Not only is there less reason to act honorably
toward the opposing party at a time of war, but, as discussed earlier,
corporate officers are likely to be concerned about their positions
within their own firms in deciding how to act in the context of a
litigation over one of their contracts. This is the case even when the
firm itself is concerned not only about the litigation, but also about
being able to maintain a continuing relationship with the opposing
party. The litigation may be seen in part as a relationship-preserving
event for the firm, but for the officer whose judgment led to the
dispute, it is much more an endgame situation.63 What this means is
that whatever opportunities are left for testimony after applying the
parol evidence rule are likely to provoke some level of dishonesty,
both by consumers against the firm, and by the firm itself.
B. Parol Evidence and the Frailty of the Language Faculty
Much of the debate about the parol evidence rule over the dec-
ades has been about its scope. Among the debated issues are: the
need for extrinsic evidence when a judge determines that the contract
was ambiguous; the need for extrinsic evidence when a court finds
that the contract was not intended to be the entire agreement
between the parties; the kind of proof of integration upon which a
court should rely; and whether a court should look provisionally at
60. Id. at 109. The authors also found that the extent to which the participants were
abstract thinkers produced more cooperative behavior in response to anticipated future
interaction.
61. Insko et al., supra note 55.
62. For application of the prisoner's dilemma to the conduct of litigants, see Ronald J.
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994) (discussing external sources of
noncooperative conduct).
63. Darley writes about fragmentation of responsibility as a source of corporate corruption.
See Darley, supra note 43, at 17-21.
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evidence to see whether what appeared at first glance to be a clear
agreement is not really clear upon further reflection. As noted in the
introduction, this is often discussed in the literature as the battle
between Williston's formalism and Corbin's contextualism. 64
The stakes in this debate are high. The worse our linguistic
capacity, the more need there is for context, and the more oppor-
tunity there is for forgetting, reconstructing and lying. The better the
language faculty, the less the need to take these problems into
account. While scholars have written about the parol evidence rule's
differential applicability in different circumstances, 6 the literature
contains no analysis of the kinds of language problems that arise in
parol evidence rule cases. What kinds of ambiguities do litigants
claim occur in legal documents?
I have surveyed recent cases from Illinois and California 66 in
which parol evidence was admitted during the past decade to see
what went wrong linguistically that caused the court to conclude that
ambiguities existed. The findings are interesting.
Many of the problems are about the goodness of fit between
particular words in the contracts and the events that occurred in the
world. For example, one Illinois case addressed the question of
whether lead paint should count as a "contaminant" for purposes of
construing a general liability insurance policy. 67 The court held that
the word in the policy was susceptible to a range of interpretations,
and therefore permitted extrinsic evidence to decide the matter.
Another asked whether a transfer between spouses should count as a
"sale" that triggers the obligation to pay a real estate broker.68 Such
problems are conceptual, and occur simply as a result of being
human. We use words with their ordinary or prototypical meanings
in mind, and often have to decide in everyday life whether a situation
that strays from the prototype, but is not very remote from the
prototype conceptually, should be included within the concept. As
64. In an extremely interesting article, Ross and Tranen adapt the arguments made in favor
of contextualizing the parol evidence rule in this way to the debate over textualism in statutory
interpretation. See Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modern Parol Evidence Rule and Its
Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. 195 (1998).
65. See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1972); Michael A. Lawrence, Comment, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status
in the Law of Contract Revisited, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1071; see also Posner, supra note 2.
66. In California, the parol evidence rule is statutory. CAL. CIV. PROC CODE § 1856
(West 1983).
67. Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Stringfield, 685 N.E.2d 980 (I1. App. Ct. 1997).
68. Foxfield Realty, Inc. v. Kubala, 678 N.E.2d 1060 (Il. App. Ct. 1997).
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Steven Winter demonstrates,69 such problems will always occur in
legal debate, and we can only resolve them by reference to context.
Other cases involve contradictory terms. The contract appeared
to say both X and not X, and the court needed to resort to extrinsic
evidence to resolve the dispute, using such information as how the
parties actually conducted themselves in performing the contract. For
example, one Illinois case discussed a note which clearly was
designated as a "demand note," but which incorporated by reference
another document that set forth specific conditions constituting a
default. 70  Another involved a contract containing apparently
inconsistent statements about the treatment of confidential
information upon contract termination. 71 A third allowed parol
evidence when the contract first imposed a duty on a general
contractor to be solely responsible for coordinating all the work on a
project, but later exculpated the general contractor from liability
resulting from the acts of subcontractors. 72  A California court
allowed parol evidence when a contract for an option to purchase real
estate contained one provision removing what appeared to be the
remaining contingencies, and another referring to a later date.73
Many disputes involve allegedly omitted terms.74 Something has
happened and the contract seems to say nothing about it. Is that
because the contract intentionally gave the plaintiff no rights with
respect to the event, or is it because the contracting parties simply
assumed the outcome? Fights over contract termination clauses
provide a rich source of examples. A contract permits termination
on, say, six months' notice. Then, the party who does not want the
contract terminated brings an action claiming that the parties had
agreed that there would be no termination absent good cause. Should
that party be permitted to introduce evidence to that effect? Courts
go both ways on the issue, but are typically fairly generous in allowing
the evidence when the contract is silent on the issue of cause,75 and do
69. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIfE, AND MIND (2001).
70. N.W.I. Int'l, Inc. v. Edgewood Bank, 684 N.E.2d 401 (111. App. Ct. 1997).
71. Quality Lighting, Inc. v. Benjamin, 592 N.E.2d 377 (I11. App. Ct. 1992).
72. A.W. Wendell & Sons, Inc. v. Qazi, 626 N.E.2d 280, 292 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
73. WYDA Assocs. v. Merner, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
74. See Hadjiyannakis, supra note 4.
75. See e.g., Varni Bros. v. Wine World, Inc., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995);
Hayter Trucking, Inc. v. Shell Western E & P, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993);
Esbensen v. Userware Int'l, Inc., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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not allow parol evidence when the contract specifically permits
termination even without good cause.76
Contract theorists have proposed that courts fill in missing con-
tractual terms by establishing default rules that will apply in contract
interpretation if the parties do not specify their agreement to other
terms." In fact, the "omitted term" cases provide the greatest
opportunity for inaccurate testimony at trial. It is easy to imagine a
party reconstructing in his own mind the negotiation of a contract to
suit the party's position in litigation. The philosopher H. Paul Grice
suggested that people routinely draw inferences from conversation to
resolve ambiguities and to fill gaps in ways that result in cooperative
conversation.7 8  A witness might construct a narrative that self-
servingly includes the implicature that will help his party's cause.
That is especially true when the actual facts were not well remem-
bered in the first place. 79
In contrast, it is difficult to find cases in which syntax is much of
an issue. The closest I came in my review of cases from these two
states during the 1990s were cases involving ambiguity of reference.
One Illinois case involved a contract with the following clause:
Work performed by [subcontractor] shall be in strict accor-
dance with all applicable plans, general conditions, specifications,
and addenda thereto, and [subcontractor] is bound by all provisions
of these documents and also all other documents to which [contrac-
tor] is bound, and to the same extent.80
The question was whether an insurance policy counted as one of the
documents. Similarly, a case from California depended upon the
meaning of "Star Trek."8 When Gene Roddenberry, the creator of
76. Heller v. Pillsbury Madison & Sutro, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996);
Haggard v. Kimberly Quality Care, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Mktg. West,
Inc. v. Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 859 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
77. This literature is voluminous. For an important early work, see Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87 (1989). For an interesting recent article that deals with cognitive biases in contract
formation that can lead to gaps in contractual language, see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and
Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms,
51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998). For a critical assessment of some of the foundations of the
theory governing contractual gaps, see Roy Kreitner, UNFINISHED STORIES-THE
NARRATIVES OF INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Chicago-Kent Law Review and Brooklyn Law School).
78. H. Paul Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS
41, 45 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
79. See supra text accompanying notes 27-39 for discussion of how failed memory and
wishful thinking combine to produce inaccurate recollections of past events.
80. Pepper Constr. Co. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 673 N.E.2d 1128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
81. Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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Star Trek, died, his first wife sued the estate to enforce the terms of
their divorce agreement. The agreement had given her "one-half
interest in all future profit participation income from 'Star Trek' to
which [she] and/or [Gene Roddenberry] are entitled. '82 The question
in that case was whether "Star Trek" included only the original
television series, which was the only one that existed at the time of
the divorce, or whether it also included subsequent series for which
Mr. Roddenberry was entitled to compensation. The court admitted
parol evidence to help decide the issue.83
Our linguistic capacities, then, are limited in some ways, but are
robust in others. The linguistic literature strongly suggests that a
great deal of meaning is fixed fairly well through the application of
syntactic rules and constraints that we apply automatically and
unselfconsciously with enormous rapidity. Analysis of the kinds of
disputes that recur in both contract law and statutory interpretation
bear this perspective out. For example, an analysis of cases decided
under the federal bribery statute shows cases disputing the applica-
bility of almost every word in the statute in one case or another, but
very few cases dealing with linguistic ambiguity resulting from
ambiguous syntactic structure. 84 Much the same seems to be true
when it comes to disputes over the meanings of contracts, a similarity
that should not be surprising. 5 What this means is that we should
expect written contracts to go a long way toward recording the
understanding between parties, but that there will necessarily be a
residual amount of uncertainty, and there will even be a residual
amount of uncertainty over whether there is uncertainty.
III. THE SAFE HARBOR FOR UNSAVORY PRECONTRACTUAL
PRACTICES
This Part of the Article will examine three situations in which the
system provides incentives for sharp practices prior to execution of a
contract. The examples are credit card operations, shrink-wrap
contents and promissory notes.
82. Id. at 910.
83. Id. at 916.
84. Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and Rules in
Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC INQUIRY 243, 245-48 (2001).
85. For discussion of the relationship between issues in contractual and statutory
interpretation, see Ross & Tranen, supra note 64.
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A. Consumer Credit Agreements
My household receives about ten credit card applications per
week. The current fad is to advertise a low, "introductory" interest
rate, typically for three or four months, and typically from zero to 3
percent. Often, these interest rates are circled in red, or otherwise
highlighted. All you have to do is sign the application, which
indicates your agreement to abide by the terms of the credit
agreement, some of the terms of which are located on the back of the
application in small print. The front of the form-the part that
contains the introductory interest rate-rarely says what the rate will
rise to after the introductory period has expired.86 It does not make
clear whether the low rate applies either to credit transfers and new
loans, or just to transfers. Nowhere is there an analysis of what
finance charges you will actually pay if you make only the minimum
payments. That is, nowhere do they tell you, either in the application
or in subsequent bills, how long each loan is calculated to be.
Much of what is on the back is complex, very difficult to read,
and relatively uninformative. Some applications do not even say
what the actual interest rate will be, because the interest rates float
with an index, usually the prime rate. Regulations require that in
these instances the current rate be disclosed,87 but it is often hard to
find that rate, since it is discussed outside the table containing the
basic information.
To illustrate, I recently received two letters indicating that I have
been pre-approved to receive a platinum credit card. One circular,"
begins with the words, "You're Pre-Approved! The G.E. Select
Platinum MasterCard.... A reflection of the quality, innovation and
spirit of G.E." These words are in italics and boldface. The text of
the letter again tells me that I have been "Pre-Approved for the
exceptional GE Select Platinum MasterCard-the card endorsed by
GE." It then explains various benefits associated with the card,
including a 1.9 percent introductory APR. One would have to look
closely to notice that the text contains footnotes. The actual notes are
in small print on the back of the document, just before various
disclosures, which are also in small print. Note 1 says: "In some
86. Those with lower subsequent rates are more likely to disclose the later rate in large
print.
87. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5 (2001).
88. G.E. SELECT PLATINUM MASTERCARD CIRCULAR (on file with author and the
Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter G.E. MASTERCARD CIRCULAR].
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instances, we may not be able to open an account for you. Please see
the 'Notice Regarding Pre-Approved Offer' for details." The second
note discloses, "the APR for cash advances is a variable rate,
currently 19.99%." The introductory rate apparently applies to
balance transfers and purchases only-not to cash advances.
Moreover, the lower credit rate, which stays in effect for about seven
months, only applies if the applicant transfers a credit balance as part
of the application. This requirement, however, is also disclosed on
the front of the application in readable print. The third note says: "In
certain instances, you may receive a Standard card with a credit line
of up to $5,000."
What can one make of these disclosures? Apparently, I've been
pre-approved for a platinum credit card, but the bank reserves the
right to give me a different card or no card at all if I do not meet
certain criteria based on its review of my "credit history, income and
the information that [I] provide. ' 89 The notice explains: "You were
selected for this offer because, based on your credit record main-
tained by credit bureaus you meet the criteria we established for the
offer." 9  In other words, "pre-approved" means targeted for this
advertisement, but subject to a review of my credit-worthiness. I
doubt that anyone receiving this notice would understand the word
"pre-approved" that way based on everyday experience.
The second "pre-approved" application is the more bizarre of
the two. The disclosures on the back are similar. The introductory
rate on the front is zero percent with no disclosure of what the fixed
rate will be. What is strange is the text, which reads in part:
You have been pre-approved for this Capital One Platinum
MasterCard with exclusive Platinum-level benefits, a credit line up
to $5,000 and a 0% introductory APR on all purchases until
December 2001. After that, you will have a fixed purchase rate of
14.9%. No security deposit is required and the application is
absolutely free. If you are not approved for a Platinum
MasterCard, you will automatically be considered for a Gold
MasterCard. (See reverse for additional information). 91
What it means to have been "pre-approved" for a credit card for
which you may not be approved is an unexplained mystery.
89. Notice Regarding Pre-Approved Offer, G.E. MASTERCARD CIRCULAR, supra note 88
(on file with author and the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
90. Id.
91. CAPITAL ONE PLATINUM MASTERCARD CIRCULAR (on file with author and The
Chicago-Kent Law Review) (boldface type in original) [hereinafter CAPITAL ONE
MASTERCARD CIRCULAR].
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Credit card issuers can circulate such applications because they
know that ultimately it is the written agreement that will govern, and
the written agreement will have no such silly contradictions. The
parol evidence rule comes into this picture once the borrower has
agreed to abide by the credit agreement by signing the application or
by using the credit card.92 Once this happens, the misleading aspects
of the application are made largely irrelevant as a matter of law. I do
not argue, however, that we should do away with the parol evidence
rule for consumer transactions. In fact, the banks are bound by the
interest rates in their credit agreements, just as are the consumers. 93
My point is more limited: Heavy reliance on the written contract
creates a safe harbor for this kind of sharp or dishonest business
practice, and if we don't like that we should regulate the undesired
consequences of the rule's application.
B. Shrink Wrap Contracts
To take another example, also involving consumers, consider
Judge Easterbrook's controversial opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000,
Inc.94 He describes the facts as follows:
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a
credit card number. Presently a box arrives, containing the
computer and a list of terms, said to govern unless the customer
returns the computer within 30 days. Are these terms effective as
the parties' contract, or is the contract term-free because the order-
taker did not read any terms over the phone and elicit the
customer's assent? 95
92. The first sample discussed here contains, again in small print, the following:
You understand that the use of an account or any card issued in connection with this
offer will constitute your acceptance of and will be subject to the terms and conditions
of the First USA Cardmember Agreement that will be sent with the card. You agree
to be responsible for all charges incurred according to the Cardmember Agreement.
You understand that the terms of your account are subject to change as provided in
the Cardmember Agreement.
G.E. MASTERCARD CIRCULAR, supra note 88 (boldface type in original).
The second application has the words, "I have read the IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES
and Miscellaneous Information on the back of the letter and agree to be bound as specified
therein." One of these disclosures on the back says, "I will receive the Capital One Customer
Agreement and am bound by its terms and all future revisions." CAPITAL ONE MASTERCARD
CIRCULAR, supra note 91.
93. There are numerous lawsuits against credit card issuers for violating the terms disclosed
in the applications, usually brought under the Truth in Lending Act. See, e.g., Demando v.
Morris, 206 F.3d 1300 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
95. Id. at 1148.
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The question in Hill was whether an arbitration clause contained
in the contract contained in the box was binding. The court held that
it was, relying heavily on an earlier opinion by Judge Easterbrook,
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,96 in which it was held that the terms in a
software box bind the software user once he has begun using the
software if he had the opportunity to reject the terms by returning the
box.
While the parol evidence rule was not at issue in Hill, the rule is
certainly lurking in the background. If the terms contained in the box
include an integration clause, then whatever happened that led to the
customer deciding to buy the computer in the first place will not be
admissible in a subsequent dispute. This may even preclude evidence
of fraud, although fraud is supposed to be an exception to the parol
evidence rule. Some courts have held that "promissory fraud" is not
an exception to the parol evidence rule 97 on the theory that "to do
otherwise would tempt litigants, courts, and juries to transform every
broken promise into a false promise. '98 While this position has been
criticized sharply in the literature99 and rejected by some courts,t ° it is
not difficult to find cases in which courts apply this principle. 0'
Furthermore, most courts hold that the parol evidence rule
trumps promissory estoppel, which means that there is a precon-
tractual safe harbor for making promises that will not be kept. °2 This
has been recognized as a problem in the scholarly literature.
Professor Knapp writes about this situation as a "double reliance
96. 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
97. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659 (Cal.
1935).
98. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.4, at 217 (2d ed. 1990).
99. See Justin Sweet, Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 CAL L. REV. 877
(1961) (suggesting that the court should overturn Pendergrass and allow all evidence of
promissory fraud).
100. See e.g., Dellcar & Co. v. Hicks 685 F. Supp. 679, 682 (N.D. Il. 1988); Parker v.
Columbia Bank, 604 A.2d 521, 529 (Md. App. 1992). 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 98, states that
"[m]ost courts treat promissory fraud like other types of fraud" for purposes of the parol
evidence rule. A review of recent case law, however, suggests that courts are more divided on
this issue. Id. at 217.
101. See, e.g., Globe Metallurgical Inc., v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 953 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.
Ohio 1996); Cong. Fin. Corp. v. John Morrell & Co., 790 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Ailing v.
Universal Mfg. Corp., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 718 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
102. See, e.g., Davis v. Univ. of Montevallo, 638 So. 2d 754, 758 (Ala. 1994) ("Courts have
been reluctant to permit the enforcement by the application of the doctrine of promissory
estoppel of promises made contemporaneously with a completed contract, evidence of which
promises comes within the prohibition of the parol evidence rule."); Prentice v. UDC Advisory
Servs., Inc., 648 N.E.2d 146 (I11. App. Ct. 1995); Schoff v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 604
N.W.2d 43, 52 n.3 (Iowa 1999).
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problem," which may arise "when an agent with apparent authority to
act generally with respect to a transaction makes promises or
representations that conflict with the writing."'10 Because of the many
exceptions to the parol evidence rule, it is not possible to conduct a
reliable survey of all cases in which the two doctrines interact. As
Professor Holmes points out, there exist cases in which courts either
do not mention the parol evidence rule at all, or hold it inapplicable
because the parol evidence itself indicates that the parties did not
agree that the written agreement embodied the entire understanding
of the parties. °4 Nonetheless, the weight of authority is heavily on the
side of the parol evidence rule when the two doctrines clash
directly.105
Judge Easterbrook's approach to contractual interpretation is
currently under serious debate. Courts have come out on both sides
of the issue,'06 and a growing literature, mostly critical, has been
exploring the consequences of the decision. °7 In fact, one law review
recently published an entire symposium on Hill v. Gateway 2000.108
One point made by several scholars is that Easterbrook's opinion
gives judicial approval to certain norms governing the conduct of
business, especially over the telephone.1°9 Professor Ghosh observes:
The choice of norms also illustrates an attempt to decentralize
norm creation. Future rules governing these transactions will be
determined by contract terms that can be dictated by Gateway or
103. Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASINGS
L.J. 1191, 1327 (1998). For additional discussion of the relationship between the parol evidence
rule and promissory estoppel, see Metzger, supra note 5; see also Eric Mills Holmes, The Four
Phases of Promissory Estoppel, 20 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 45, 60-62 (1996).
104. See Holmes, supra note 103, at 61 (discussing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456
F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972)).
105. See Knapp, supra note 103, at 1310-13.
106. Compare Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998), with
Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr. Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D. Utah 1997).
107. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Consumers Surfing for Sales in Cyberspace: What Constitutes
Acceptance and What Legal Terms and Conditions Bind the Consumer?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
741 (2000); Walter A. Effross, The Legal Architecture of Virtual Stores: World Wide Web Sites
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1263 (1997); Bernstein, supra note
51; Robert J. Morrill, Comment, Contract Formation and the Shrink Wrap License: A Case
Comment on ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 513 (1998).
108. See Symposium, Common Sense and Contracts Symposium, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1037
(2000).
109. See Thomas Joo, Common Sense and Contract Law: Fear of a Normative Planet?, 16
TOURO L. REV. 1037 (2000); Shubha Ghosh, Where's the Sense in Hill v. Gateway 2000?:
Reflections on the Visible Hand of Norm Creation, 16 TOURO L. REv. 1125 (2000); Deborah W.
Post, Dismantling Democracy: Common Sense and the Contract Jurisprudence of Frank
Easterbrook, 16 TOURO L. REV. 1205 (2000).
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other sellers. Courts should defer to what companies define to be
the practice regarding consumer transactions. 110
Interestingly, part of Judge Easterbrook's rationale in the opin-
ion was that Hill should have known that there would be additional
terms because Gateway's advertisements refer to warranties without
specifying their terms."' But Hill was claiming that the advertising
was false and misleading-the components that came in the box did
not match those specified in Gateway's advertisements. 1 2
Easterbrook, then, seems to be approving of business norms in which
a great deal of the burden falls on the consumer. It is the buyer's
obligation to draw inferences from advertisements about the terms of
the transaction, but the seller will not necessarily be held responsible
for misstatements in those same advertisements.
Whether or not one agrees with Judge Easterbrook's resolution
of the particular cases he decided, the seller's conduct will not always
be easy to paint in innocent terms. Consider the experience of
deciding what computer to buy. Many stores have inexperienced
sales help with little knowledge of computers. As an experiment, I
recently went to such a store and asked questions about printers. The
information I received from one salesman was at odds with the
information I received from another. I was quite sure that both of
them made up much of what they said in any event.
Here again, by giving premium status to written contracts, the
legal system creates a safe harbor for less than honorable business
practices in advance. That is exactly what we should expect to have
happen, given the enormous pressure to show profits and the internal
incentive systems within firms."3
C. Promissory Notes
Consider the following scenario, which recurs in the case law
with some frequency: Two firms are involved in a business relation-
ship, and one owes money to the other for goods or services. The
debtor company, in order to avoid more drastic action from the
110. Ghosh, supra note 109, at 1141.
111. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
112. Joo, supra note 109, at 1038.
113. Some of the advantage that companies have over consumers may be a matter of
disparate conceptualizations that each side brings to the transaction. A consumer who looks at
a purchase as a simple matter, modeled on buying an object at a store, may not consider the
legal consequences of failing to pay attention to a set of unfamiliar rules dictated by the seller.
See Beverly Horsburgh & Andrew Cappel, Cognition and Common Sense in Contract Law, 16
TOURO L. REV. 1091 (2000).
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creditor company, signs promissory notes for the full amount due as
of a date certain, either the date they are signed, or some future date.
Perhaps the owner of the debtor firm signs on his own behalf as well
as his company's behalf. The date on the note passes, and payment in
full has not been made. The creditor company sues. The maker of
the note for the debtor company tries to defend on the ground that he
only signed the note on the promise that the creditor would not
actually try to collect until the debtor had a chance to straighten out
its financial problems. This promise, courts often hold, is inconsistent
with the notes themselves, and therefore evidence of it is inadmissible
under the parol evidence rule.114
These are especially difficult cases, since they engage both the
reasons for having a parol evidence rule and the risks of having a
parol evidence rule. Some creditors will indeed say whatever they
must to get the debtor to sign the promissory note, knowing full well
that the pre-execution promises will not be enforceable later. On the
other hand, some debtors will creatively and sometimes falsely divine
representations from creditors to save their businesses. Who should
the law protect?
Professor Burnham describes the conflict over whether the parol
evidence rule should apply in this sort of routine commercial dispute
as follows:
In one view of the world, things should function tidily. People
should think before they act, seek advice when out of their depth,
know what they are getting into, read all documents, and write
down all their agreements. If they do not, the law will see that they
suffer the consequences....
In the other view of the world, people screw up. They grope
their way through a complex and demanding world, doing the best
they can, which is often not good enough, and they fall into
traps.... If the particular story is compelling enough, they will be
rescued.'15
If this is what is at stake, then we should expect to see courts
deciding these kinds of cases in both directions, and that is just what
happens. While many courts apply the parol evidence rule and refuse
to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
114. See, e.g., WWF Paper Corp. v. Quinlan, No. 00-Civ.-0512, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3444
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2001); Friends Lumber, Inc. v. Cornell Dev. Corp., 663 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329
(App. Div. 1997).
115. Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don't Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. L.
REV. 93, 141-42 (1994). For discussion, see Knapp, supra note 103, at 1314-15.
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notes,116 others react as a New York appellate court did in DeVito v.
Benjamin:17
Although the parol evidence rule bars evidence offered to contra-
dict the express terms of a document, the rule does not preclude a
party from offering evidence demonstrating that what appears to be
an obligation was not intended to be an obligation at all.' 18
The court permitted evidence of the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the note, reversing the lower court's grant of
summary judgment. These are cases in which the law appears to
make a formalistic choice, and judges circumvent it when they think
that justice so demands.119
IV. WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
I have suggested that the following observations hold:
1. People forget what was said;
2. People lie about what was said;
3. People re-create the reality of what was said in self-
serving ways so that they no longer believe that they have
forgotten; they are not lying, but surely are not saying
anything true;
4. Language is not precise enough to state terms clearly and
crisply in contracts all of the time, but it is precise enough
to state terms clearly and crisply in contracts much of the
time;
116. See Banco do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Parker v. Cook, 548 S.E.2d 387 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Gross v. Fruchter, 646 N.Y.S.2d 53 (App.
Div. 1996); Jones v. Sageeyah Dev. Ltd., 833 P.2d 1235 (Okla. 1992); Bourg v. Bristol Boat Co.,
705 A.2d 969 (R.I. 1998); see also Perfection Metal and Supply Co. v. Indep. Supply of N.O. Inc.,
707 So. 2d 86 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (involving a guarantee agreement).
117. 663 N.Y.S.2d 266 (App. Div. 1997).
118. Id. at 267 (citations omitted) (relying on RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE,
RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 11-202 (lth ed. 1998)).
119. See, e.g., Capdeville v. White's Temple of Church of God in Christ, Inc., 755 So. 2d 923
(La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that parol evidence was properly admitted to correct a mutual
mistake of parties); Venners v. Goldberg, 758 A.2d 567 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (parol
evidence may be admitted to show whether there was a failure of consideration); Roberts v.
Maze, 985 P.2d 211 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that parol evidence to show a contract was a
sham is allowed based on the state statute's language which permits such evidence when the
validity of the agreement is in dispute); Ebert v. Ebert, 465 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that parol evidence is admissible to clarify ambiguity created because a particular
matter is not expressly included in the written instrument); Berg v. Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222
(Wash. 1990) (holding that extrinsic evidence is admissible to understand the context under
which a written instrument was executed to aid in the interpretation of words).
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5. Sometimes we think we have said something clearly, but
it can be understood differently, and will be understood
differently if we are not given the opportunity to explain
ourselves;
6. The pressure on people in businesses to produce is enor-
mous, and the pressure on people who have lost money
on deals is also great, so businesses will try to take
advantage of a parol evidence rule if there is one, and
plaintiffs will try to take advantage of there not being a
parol evidence rule if there isn't one;
7. The internal pressures within firms sometimes pit
productivity against moral conduct, at least in the
short-term.
If all of this is true -and I think it is - then irreconcilable tensions will
inevitably occur, which will frustrate the ability of any parol evidence
rule to accomplish its goals without incurring a substantial cost. We
must, then, find ways of addressing some of these problems more
directly. I will suggest a few tentatively. I will not try to defend these
suggestions in detail here, in part because I offer them principally as
illustrations of the need for approaches outside the system of
evidentiary rules.
Part of the theory of the firm, as reflected in positive law,120 is the
notion that firms should have the right to enter into contracts and to
sue or be sued for their breach. 12  Within the system, we consider
firms to be "legal persons," which permits them to aggregate the
wealth of many in carrying out their business, and we advantage firms
with rules of evidence, such as the parol rule, designed to promote the
smooth flow of commerce. 22 This, I believe, should be the starting
point of addressing the problems I have raised.
First, dishonesty in the legal system should not be tolerated-
with or without a parol evidence rule. No doubt the rule does a great
deal to encourage people to come to agreements in writing, and
reduces the opportunity for inaccurate testimony, whatever the
motivation. For the most part, the frailty of the language faculty
supports the Corbin approach to parol evidence-a soft rule that
allows testimony, at least provisionally, to try to convince the court
120. For the history of this idea, see MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 (1977).
121. See, e.g., 8 DEL CODE ANN. § 122 (2001).
122. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 5, at 1389; Sweet, supra note 5, at 1050.
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that the language was not intended to convey the message that an
unexplained reading might lead one to believe. When, either because
the court finds a term ambiguous, or because a court permits a party
to try to convince the court of an ambiguity, or for any other reason,
there is testimony and the testimony is perjured, there should be
some serious consequences.
One possibility is to increase the frequency with which perjury in
civil cases is referred for prosecution. For the most part, President
Clinton was right during the impeachment dispute-such prose-
cutions happen, but very rarely in the scheme of things. In the
business context, many instances in which people testify inaccurately
will not amount to perjury, for reasons stated above. But when
perjury is obvious, it should not be tolerated.
A far more aggressive approach, also related to Clinton, is to
treat firms the way we treat lawyers and others with special
obligations to society. Clinton's suspension from the Arkansas bar 13
was a statement that lawyers are members of society with special
privileges and with a special relationship to the courts. If they behave
dishonorably, even in a situation that has little to do with their own
practice of law, the legal system will express its disapproval.124
Firms, and corporations in particular, are also in a special po-
sition in society. They are created by statute and permitted to make
significant decisions about the distribution of resources. Further,
firms are almost always the beneficiaries of the parol evidence rule's
application, both in disputes against consumers and in disputes
against other firms.1 25 The party that benefits from the disallowance
123. The New York Times reported:
Former President Bill Clinton has paid a $25,000 fine that was part of a sanction in
which his Arkansas law license was suspended for five years.
Mr. Clinton paid the fine with a personal check on March 21, said Marie-Bernarde
Miller, the lawyer who handled a disbarment lawsuit brought by a committee of the
Arkansas Supreme Court. "The case is completed," Ms. Miller said.
Clinton Pays $25,000 Fine in Arkansas Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 8, 2001, § 1, at 30.
124. In the opinion holding Clinton in contempt, Judge Wright wrote:
[T]he President's contumacious conduct in this case, coming as it did from a member
of the bar and the chief law enforcement officer of this Nation, was withoutjustification and undermined the integrity of the judicial system.... Sanctions must be
imposed, not only to redress the misconduct of the President in this case, but to deter
others who... might themselves consider emulating the President of the United States
by willfully violating discovery orders of this and other courts, thereby engaging in
conduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system.
Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1131 (E.D. Ark. 1999). One of the sanctions involved
reporting Clinton's conduct to the Arkansas Supreme Court's Committee on Professional
Conduct for disciplinary action, if they deemed it appropriate. Id. at 1132.
125. That is certainly the case for the opinions from Illinois and California reviewed in the
context of preparing this article. That does not mean, however, that corporations are the only
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of testimony so much of the time should not be willfully engaging in
dishonesty when testimony is allowed. Corporate officers should
simply not be lying in court either to protect their own status within
their companies or to protect corporate profits to keep share prices
elevated. Companies whose representatives lie in court might be
subject to sanctions similar to those imposed on lawyers.
It would be impractical to suspend charters, especially of big
firms. That would affect large numbers of innocent people. But in
especially egregious cases, legislatures or courts might consider
having corporations held in a type of constructive receivership for a
period of time, by which the company is deemed to be operating for
the benefit of society at large, with its profits being available to the
state. I do not mean by this any actual receivership, which would
involve interference in management. Rather, I mean merely that a
period be named (perhaps one day, or one week, depending on the
inconvenience and expense to which the liar put the judicial system),
and that profits for that period be paid to the state as a kind of civil
fine resulting from a constructive trust formed by the fact that the
company is in constructive receivership. 12 6
Without question, this approach has its problems, both practical
and philosophical. For one thing, it calls for treating the parties to a
litigation asymmetrically. If one party happens to be a business firm,
its stakes are higher than are those for an individual. Particularly
vigilant litigators may try to take advantage of this asymmetry to
create strategic advantages within a lawsuit. That kind of conduct has
been an unfortunate part of practice under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In fact, Rule 11 was amended in 1993 in
part as a response to its employment by some lawyers as part of an
aggressive litigation strategy.127
ones who benefit from written contracts. If, for example, corporations routinely perform the
portions of contracts about which consumers are most likely to complain, and then protect
themselves in writing from the kinds of complaints that consumers are most likely to make, one
would expect to see disproportionately many cases in which the beneficiary of the parol
evidence rule is the firm. Even in this instance, the firm has benefited by having the means and
knowledge, as a repeat performer, to know what to draft into the contract.
126. The expression "constructive receivership" turns up from time to time in the case law,
but the device is not one that is really used in legal settings. See Sec. Pac. Mortgage & Real
Estate Servs., Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines, 962 F.2d 204 (2nd Cir. 1992); Prince v. First
City, Texas/Houston, N.A., 853 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App. 1993).
127. See, e.g., A. Leon Higgenbotham, Jr. et al., Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil
Procedure Rule 11, 137 F.R.D. 159 (1991); Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 599 (1998); Development in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and
Lawyers' Responses, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1547, 1629-51 (1994).
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The best response to this is that these one-way advantages occur
all the time in the litigation system. Such an advantage occurs when
the conduct of one party but not the other is subject to regulation by
an authority that may inflict punishment for dishonest conduct
outside of the litigation at hand. The Clinton case is an obvious
example, but these situations arise in all kinds of circumstances. For
example, a party finds itself in a position to reap a windfall settlement
in litigation over a transaction that their opponent used as part of a
tax fraud scheme.
My suggestion is far less troubling than such cases. The greater
obligation for corporations to act honorably in the litigation process
relates directly to the advantages drawn from the parol evidence rule
itself. In part, for the sake of a less encumbered system of commerce,
contract law has grown to favor written instruments. It is not
unreasonable for society to require a heightened level of respon-
sibility within the legal system for the recipients of such largess.
Moreover, the enormous pressures placed on corporate execu-
tives to operate successfully creates such strong incentives for
dishonest conduct when the stakes are high' 28 that we should not
expect a reduction in pressures without changing the incentive system
within the firm.129  Possible solutions include restructuring firms
internally, or adding external incentives through the litigation system
itself. While this particular proposal may seem rather radical, any
solution will have to deal with the incentives and pressures that
corporate executives face. Society should decide, apart from the
parol evidence rule, what to do about sharp business practices prior to
execution of the contract. The credit card example cries out for
regulation. 130 While the Truth in Lending Act already requires some
disclosure, it is self-evidently too weak in its current form.' The
Senate has recently passed S. 420, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
128. See Part 1I, supra.
129. See Darley, supra note 47.
130. Recently, as reported in the press, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency settled a
case it had brought against Providian National Bank for unfair and deceptive trade practices in
the marketing of credit cards, alleging violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
case settled for $300 million. See, e.g., Edmund Sanders, Providian Ordered to Pay Cardholders
$300-Million Refund, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at C1. It is not clear that this type of action
will recur, but it is another possible avenue of consumer protection against dishonest
precontractual conduct. See McNeill Y. Wester, Note, OCC v. Providian National Bank:
Enforcement of the FTC's Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Statute by the OCC, 5 N.C.
BANKING INST. 373 (2001).
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2001). The Act authorizes the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to promulgate disclosure regulations. See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a (2001)
(requiring disclosure of annual percentage rate in credit card applications).
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2001, Title XIII of which is intended to amend the Truth in Lending
Act to require additional disclosures to credit card holders.3 2 Among
them are disclosures about the economic consequences of making
only minimum payments,133 and disclosure about interest rates that
will be paid once a low introductory rate has expired.3 4 The House's
version requires similar disclosures.'35
Detailed precontractual disclosures are already required for
mortgages, and rental car agencies, and hotels seem able to bring
salient terms to a customer's attention by having them circle and
initial the important items. The banking industry, however, has a
strong lobby in Washington 136 that has worked hard to block
legislation requiring banks to disclose information to consumers that
may reduce the likelihood of their borrowing money they cannot
easily repay. 137
132. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420, 107th Cong. (2001).
133. Id § 1301.
134. Section 1303 requires, in part, the following disclosures:
(ii) if the annual percentage rate of interest that will apply after the end of the
temporary rate period will be a fixed rate, state in a clear and conspicuous manner in a
prominent location closely proximate to the first listing of the temporary annual
percentage rate (other than a listing of the temporary annual percentage rate in the
tabular format described in section 122(c)), the time period in which the introductory
period will end and the annual percentage rate that will apply after the end of the
introductory period; and
(iii) if the annual percentage rate that will apply after the end of the temporary
rate period will vary in accordance with an index, state in a clear and conspicuous
manner in a prominent location closely proximate to the first listing of the temporary
annual percentage rate (other than a listing in the tabular format prescribed by section
122(c)), the time period in which the introductory period will end and the rate that will
apply after that, based on an annual percentage rate that was in effect within 60 days
before the date of mailing the application or solicitation.
Id. § 1303.
135. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th
Cong. (2001).
136. The extent of the banking industry's lobbying was reported widely in the press. For
example, conservative columnist William F. Buckley, writing a column that criticized more
liberal writers for tolerating irresponsible behavior on the part of defaulting credit card users,
also wrote:
The avarice of the credit card industry is unmistakably there. Invitations to sign up are
everywhere, the costs of doing so understated. What tends to happen is credit card
ballooning, keeping one company at bay while living off the second, in turn kept at bay
while living off the third and fourth, and so on.
William F. Buckley, Jr., Lenders Are Only as Greedy as Borrowers, HOUSTON CHRON., March
17, 2001, at 34. In the article that Buckley was criticizing, The New York Times reported:
The bill's passage would be evidence of the heightened power of corporate lobbyists in
Washington in the aftermath of last year's elections, which left the White House and
both houses of Congress in the hands of business-friendly Republicans.
Philip Shenon, Hard Lobbying on Debtor Bill Pays Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2001, at
Al.
137. For discussion of the role of the consumer credit industry in the legislative process, see
Edward J. Janger, The Locus of Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Federal Law, and Bankruptcy
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Ultimately, left behind is a residue of cases in which the contract
is not clearly clear, the parties are not clearly lying, and testimony is
not clearly disallowed. Many commercial disputes take this form. It
is here that I believe we have to live with a system that works fairly
well as it is, and with a little tough luck. As human beings, our ability
to get to the bottom of things takes us only so far.
Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 97, 111 (2000).
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